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ARTICLE
THE PRESIDENT AND THE MYTH OF
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN*
INTRODUCTION
I am delighted to have the opportunity to debate, in print, my old
friend—the charming and brilliant Dean Vikram Amar of the University of
Illinois College of Law—as part of the University of St. Thomas Law Jour-
nal ’s 2017 symposium on Presidential Executive Power Under the Consti-
tution. I first met Vik when he was a brand-new first-year law student in the
fall of 1986, while visiting his older brother, my former law school room-
mate, Akhil Amar. Vik and I became, first, acquaintances and, over the
years, friends—as well as occasional sparring partners on great questions of
constitutional law.
This essay is an attempt to recreate, in writing, my side of the extem-
poraneous lunchtime debate between Vik and me on a provocative cluster
of questions posed by the symposium editors: Does the president possess
the constitutional power—and perhaps even the duty—to decline to execute
statutes on constitutional grounds? Is such a power and duty of the presi-
dent independent of the courts’ exercise of their similar duty? That is, may
the president refuse to execute statutes on constitutional grounds rejected
by the courts? Or is the president bound in the exercise of any constitutional
interpretive authority he possesses by judicial precedents of the Supreme
Court (and other federal and state courts)? Finally, pressing the issue to its
logical extreme: If the president may decline to follow judicial precedents
as law in matters other than the case decided, may he likewise decline to
follow a judicial decision in a decided case? Put differently: Does the presi-
dent possess the constitutional power—and perhaps even the duty—to de-
cline to execute judicial decrees and judgments that he concludes are
contrary to the Constitution or other governing federal law?
I call our respective position a “debate,” but I use the term gently. Not
only are Vik and I friends—which tends to give our disagreements more the
* University Chair & Professor of Law, The University of St. Thomas. Copyright Michael
Stokes Paulsen 2018, All Rights Reserved.
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character of friendly discussion than fevered argument—but we share (to a
degree) much the same starting point. We agree that the independence and
separation of the three branches of the federal government, together with
the fundamental axiom of constitutional supremacy, implies that each of the
branches possesses a measure of independence from the others in the inter-
pretation and enforcement of the Constitution. We simply follow these
premises to different stopping points. Neither of us subscribes whole-hog to
the myth of judicial supremacy—the virulent error that misreads (or misrep-
resents) Marbury v. Madison as if it stood for the proposition that the prov-
ince of constitutional interpretation is reserved entirely for the judiciary,
with the other branches of government reduced to ciphers possessing no
truly independent role or voice on constitutional questions. The Myth of
Marbury is precisely that—a myth.1 The right starting point is that each of
the branches of the national government possesses a legitimate and (in the
main) independent province of constitutional interpretation. Vik Amar and I
agree on that much, I think. I simply go a step or two further than Vik does
in following first premises to what I believe are their logical and necessary
conclusion.
My thesis—one that I have advanced in other writing2—is that the
president has a fully coequal and independent power and duty of faithful
1. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706
(2003).
2. I apologize for the obligatory string citation of my own prior work, but it’s the simplest
way of giving the reader the necessary references (and acknowledging a good bit of self-plagia-
rism): For the most complete exposition of my view, including an exhaustive description of the
textual, structural, and historical evidence in support of complete independent presidential inter-
pretive parity with the courts and Congress, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen,
The Most Dangerous Branch]. For a further defense, and responses to certain objections and
inquiries, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to
Professors Levinson and Eisgruber, 83 GEO. L.J. 385 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, Protestantism
and Comparative Competence]. For a reprise, response to certain objections, and elaboration of
structural and historical arguments for “executive review” in the context of discussion of a famous
case, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-Five
Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337 (1999) [hereinafter Paulsen, Nixon Now]. For a somewhat earlier,
briefer, wittier presentation of the essential dilemma posed by the colliding premises of the coor-
dinacy and coequality of the branches (on the one hand) and the idea of judicial supremacy over
the other branches in the sense of the assumed obligation of the executive to enforce specific
judicial judgments or decrees (on the other), see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power
and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993)
[hereinafter Paulsen, The Merryman Power]. For a discussion of Abraham Lincoln’s stance and its
progression in the direction of an increasingly complete view of independent presidential interpre-
tive power, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1227 (2008). For a general discussion that the constitutional argument and premises of Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) yields the conclusion not of judicial supremacy (as is
widely but incorrectly believed) but of constitutional supremacy and the coequal interpretive au-
thority of multiple actors within our constitutional system, see Paulsen, supra note 1.
I should acknowledge that some of the specific formulations in the text are ones that I have
used in developing this family of arguments in online articles and blog posts. Michael Stokes
Paulsen, A “Judicial Supremacy” Test Question, NAT’L REV. (June 9, 2015), http://www.national
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constitutional interpretation, which may be exercised in ways at variance
with judicial interpretations of the Constitution. This power, I submit, ex-
tends to and applies with respect to the exercise of all of the president’s
constitutional powers—the qualified veto power over bills passed by Con-
gress, the pardon power, appointments, military Commander-in-Chief, and
law-execution generally, including the execution of judicial decrees.
Vik Amar goes some of this distance—a good bit of the way, in fact—
but alas turns back, chicken-heartedly, when crossing the road gets a little
scary.3 My stance in this colloquy is that there is no good principled justifi-
cation for turning tail and running away from the full logical implications of
the principle of coordinate, coequal presidential interpretive power.
In Part I, I begin by briefly setting forth what seems to be the general
academic consensus on this issue and argue that that consensus is incoher-
ent and unprincipled. In Part II, I develop one of my favorite hypotheticals
driving this point home—an imaginary (but not entirely unprecedented)
modern “Sedition Act” that is flagrantly unconstitutional but nonetheless
enacted by Congress and upheld by courts. A picture is worth a thousand
words and my hypothetical “story problem” illustrates my position per-
fectly. In Part III, I apply the principle of coordinate, coequal interpretive
power to reach the straightforward conclusion that the president has both
the power and duty not to enforce or execute unconstitutional laws, whether
or not the judiciary agrees with the president’s good faith constitutional
judgment. That power extends to vetoes, pardons, and law-execution alike.
Finally, in Part IV, I argue that the same premises and the same logic yield
the bracing and unconventional conclusion that the president has both the
power and duty not to enforce unconstitutional judicial decisions—judg-
ments in the specific case rendered, that the president in good faith judges
to be contrary to controlling law.
My position is not without its problems and is vulnerable to certain
obvious objections. But I believe it is superior to the contrary position,
which suffers from serious logical flaws and tends to collapse into complete
judicial supremacy—a position utterly at odds with first constitutional prin-
review.com/bench-memos/419516/judicial-supremacy-test-question-michael-stokes-paulsen;
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Model Answer to the “Judicial Supremacy” Test Question, Part 1,
NAT’L REV. (June 11, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/419615/model-an
swer-judicial-supremacy-test-question-part-1-michael-stokes-paulsen; Michael Stokes Paulsen, A
Model Answer to the “Judicial Supremacy” Test Question, Part 2, NAT’L REV. (June 11, 2015),
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/419658/model-answer-judicial-supremacy-test-
question-part-2-michael-stokes-paulsen; Michael Stokes Paulsen, “Model Answer,” Part 3: May
Juries Properly Disregard Erroneous Judicial Legal Instructions?, NAT’L REV. (June 11, 2015),
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/419668/model-answer-part-3-may-juries-properly-
disregard-erroneous-judicial-legal; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Model Answer, Part 4: May the Pres-
ident Decline to Execute Judicial Decrees on Constitutional Grounds?, NAT’L REV. (June 12,
2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/419687/model-answer-part-4-may-presi
dent-decline-execute-judicial-decrees-constitutional.
3. The reader at this point of course should interpolate into the text a stage wink and smile.
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ciples of separation of powers. The chief problems with my view are two: it
is inconsistent with much modern practice; and, taken seriously, it is sus-
ceptible to abuse by an abusive president. Both points are true. Completely
coequal interpretive power is not our current operating paradigm; it is pre-
cisely the burden of my argument that our current practice of de facto judi-
cial supremacy is contrary to first principles of our written constitution.
And coequal presidential interpretive power can be abused. (As I write, the
presidency is held by a person who appears uniquely unqualified by charac-
ter, temperament, and experience to exercise presidential power, of this or
any other type, properly and in good faith.) But the potential abuse of a
power is not a constitutional argument against its existence. It is, rather, an
argument that such power should be effectively checked by the independent
exercise of the coequal interpretive power of the other branches (and vested
in fit executive hands in the first place—a matter of politics and a responsi-
ble public). Wherever interpretive power exists, it can be abused. That, in-
deed, is why the framers devised a constitutional structure of separation of
powers, with independent branches armed with some autonomous and some
intersecting powers, creating the possibility of meaningful checks and bal-
ances. The prospect of abuse of interpretive power, and thus the desirability
of checks on its exercise, is precisely why the most wrong answer is to
claim that one branch has complete (or practical) interpretive supremacy
over the others.
I. THE INCOHERENT CONSENSUS
I begin with a brief summary of the general consensus: Nearly every-
one, it seems, defends at least some version of the view that the federal
judiciary’s final judgments in cases or controversies actually decided by the
courts are conclusive and binding on the other branches of the national gov-
ernment and on state government actors. Some go further than that, to vary-
ing degrees embracing some version or another of the myth of judicial
supremacy and giving binding effect to a judicial judgment even beyond the
parameters of the specific case decided.4 But (almost) everyone agrees that,
at the very least, a court’s final resolution of a specific case is binding on
the parties, on the executive, and on the legislature.5
At the same time, nearly everyone, it seems, defends at least some
limited version of the rather different proposition—in considerable tension
with the first—that the other branches possess a sphere of autonomy and
independence in constitutional interpretation. That is, Congress, the presi-
dent, and perhaps others possess a “coequal” prerogative of constitutional
interpretation—at least to some extent.6
4. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 2706–2710.
5. See generally Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 2, at 81–82.
6. Id.
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With deep respect for all involved in this discussion—including Dean
Amar—I believe that to hold both propositions simultaneously is analyti-
cally incoherent. Genuinely “coequal” interpretive authority and “judicial
supremacy” (to any degree) are fundamentally inconsistent with one an-
other. One of the two propositions inevitably swallows up the other. Con-
sider them one at a time.
If the specific judgments of the judiciary are supreme and binding on
everyone else, and if the judiciary is likewise supreme in deciding the scope
and content of such judgments as well as its own jurisdiction and authority
to enter them, there is no genuine sphere of independent interpretive author-
ity in the other branches. Any such asserted sphere of “independent” inter-
pretive authority by others is illusory; it exists solely as a matter of judicial
grace. The power to render judgments that bind the actions of other
branches swallows up any pretense of coequal interpretive power, for the
assumed judicial power to bind always could be leveraged into a power to
direct compliance with the judiciary’s views in all respects and in all exer-
cises of power by the other branches. This renders any claim that such a
judicial power is itself merely a “coequal” interpretive power a complete
misnomer. As Orwell might have put it: all branches possess coequal inter-
pretive power, but the judiciary’s coequal interpretive power is more coe-
qual than everybody else’s!7
On the other hand, if the power to interpret the Constitution is truly a
co-equal power, shared in common by all governmental actors incidental to
their other assigned powers and functions, and not authoritatively assigned
7. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 104 (Akasha Publ’g 2008) (1945).
An attractive but unsuccessful attempt to evade being gored by this horn of the dilemma is
the argument that “each branch can say no” and that every such “no” is an absolute “stop sign” (or
“red light”) that no other branch can breach. The judiciary’s “stop” command simply comes last,
giving the judges functionally the last word on constitutionality. Ah, but here’s the rub: all legal
questions present interests on opposing sides; a “stop” in one direction is a “go” in the other, and
there is no intrinsic right assignment of what constitutes “stopping” another branch’s actions as
opposed to ordering another branch to engage in action. Similarly, “rights” do not come with
nonarbitrary labels. Take Dred Scott (please): Is a judicial holding invalidating the Missouri Com-
promise’s prohibition of slavery in a federal territory a “stop” sign protecting individual “rights”
from government intrusion (in the form of the legal property rights of slaveholders), and thus
binding on the other branches of government (because the judiciary spoke last)? Or is it an affirm-
ative order to return an individual to slavery, eviscerating his rights, and affirmatively coercing the
other branches to obey? Likewise: Is the holding in Roe v. Wade protective of individual rights to
reproductive freedom or destructive of individual rights to life? Is it a “stop sign” with respect to
government interference with pregnant women’s freedom of action or a “compulsion sign” that
orders government not to protect individual rights—that government may not protect individual
rights of unborn human beings to life? In each such instance, everything—including of course the
characterization of the decision as a “stop” or a “go” and the result as favoring or opposing
individual rights—turns on the substantive resolution of the underlying constitutional question.
To say that each branch has a “stop” that prevents the others’ “go” is to beg entirely the question
of the merits of the asserted legal rights on each side of the question. Likewise, to assert that each
branch has a constitutional “veto” on the acts of the other—but that the judiciary’s veto forbids
everybody else’s action—begs the substantive question of the true character of the supposed
“veto.”
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to any of them, no governmental actors are bound in any of their actions by
the views of any one of the others. (This is my position.) On such a view, it
is hard to carve out, legitimately, an exception for the supremacy of judicial
judgments that does not end up defeating the general rule. The exception is
either a spurious one—it exists by the grace of the other actors who will-
ingly accede to wrong judgments, not because the Constitution commands
such a result, but because they have chosen to allow it—or the exception, if
constitutionally mandated, turns around and devours the supposed coordi-
nate-and-coequal-interpretive-power general rule.
This was essentially the position I took in one of the first articles I
wrote as a young law professor, back before the invention of the typewriter.
In The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive
Branch Interpretation, I argued that the consensus view made no logical
sense:
The premises of executive branch interpretive autonomy and of
judicial supremacy are, in principle, irreconcilable. Either the ex-
ecutive branch possesses the prerogative of autonomous legal in-
terpretation within the sphere of its powers or it is subordinate to
the judiciary; the two propositions cannot peacefully coexist. The
premises supporting the two polar positions pose a sharp di-
lemma, forcing the principled interpreter down one slippery slope
or the other. In the one case, one series of conclusions inexorably
follows from the premise. In the other case, a different series of
conclusions necessarily follows—irreconcilable with the first set.
One or the other of the polar-case concessions making up the pre-
vailing consensus must be wrong in principle, according to the
premises that make the other polar-case right in principle.8
If one starts with the idea of judicial supremacy as to judgments, but
then asserts that presidential pardons and vetoes on constitutional grounds
rejected by the courts are permissible, one has a particular set of problems.
For openers, if Supreme Court precedents are, as to judgments, “supreme”
statements of the law, then presidential vetoes and pardons premised on a
contrary view are simply the (hypothetically unreviewable) lawless actions
of the executive branch, conveniently immune from judicial interference
because matters of exclusive executive prerogative under the Constitution.
That doesn’t make Jefferson’s Sedition Act of 1798 pardons (and nullifica-
tions of pending prosecutions) and Jackson’s bank re-charter veto acts of
salutary independent constitutional interpretation, but acts of lawless consti-
tutional impudence beyond the reach of the law (i.e., the courts). That is
hardly a satisfying rationale for the validity of those acts. It also bears no
resemblance at all to the constitutional justifications Jefferson and Jackson
offered for them.9
8. Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 2, at 83.
9. For more on these actions of presidential constitutional interpretation, see infra Part III.
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But that leads to the second problem with this judicial-supremacy-
with-exceptions view: Who determines which presidential actions are “ex-
ceptions” to judicial supremacy? As I put it nearly a quarter century ago:
Who determines what areas of executive authority and exercises
of executive power are “exclusive” or “unreviewable” in the first
place? The courts? The President? The judicial-supremacy-with-
exceptions approach only relocates the central dilemma of who
has final interpretive power. Pardons and vetoes are deceptively
easy-seeming cases; they are easy only because it has become
well-accepted that the President has essentially unbridled discre-
tion as to their use. But the scope of permissible exercise of the
pardon and veto powers is, after all, a question of constitutional
interpretation. If such questions are committed to the judiciary’s
supreme determination, then the notion of unreviewable executive
powers is illusory: The President is permitted to exercise such
powers “without judicial interference” only because the judiciary
has first decided to allow him such discretion. . . .
In sum, the “exclusive executive sphere” theory, if allowed, is
either an unprincipled exception that contradicts the very premise
of the judicial supremacy rule, or a grand illusion under which a
sphere of executive interpretive autonomy exists only because the
judiciary says it does.10
Similarly, if one starts with the idea of executive branch coequal inter-
pretive authority, but then asserts an exception in favor of the judiciary’s
supremacy as to final judicial judgments, one inevitably slides down the
opposite slippery slope. If judgments are binding as law, why isn’t the pres-
ident bound to follow them as law outside the judgment context? Why isn’t
disobedience to the judiciary’s legal reasoning in support of a judgment (on
this view) an act of executive bad faith, every bit as much as disobedience
to a judgment itself? And, if the judiciary has the last word as to judgments,
why can’t the judiciary simply order executive compliance with its judg-
ments’ reasoning, prospectively and generally, as an aspect of its judgment?
Again, as I said in 1993:
The theoretical power of the courts to have the last word any time
they assert it means that the executive acts in bad faith by not
according “the law” as declared by courts the same generality of
application as statutory law.
Moreover, if the President does not conform his conduct to judi-
cially-declared law in the form of precedents, the judiciary theo-
retically can order him to do so. The Supreme Court could declare
in any case that its ruling must be given general effect. (Indeed,
that is precisely what it purported to say with respect to all of its
pronouncements in Cooper v. Aaron.) . . . Taken seriously, the
10. Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 2, at 101, 103.
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exception swallows the rule. If the executive branch must honor
and enforce court judgments, then it has no genuine sphere of
interpretive autonomy.11
The same problem inheres in the judgment-supremacy view no matter
how one tries to tame it—as Professor Will Baude attempts to do, for exam-
ple, by limiting judgment supremacy to true “cases” and controversies
within the scope of a court’s proper “jurisdiction.”12 It’s almost too easy to
point out the problems with such an attempted taming: Who ultimately de-
cides what constitutes a “case”? Who ultimately decides what does or does
not fall within the scope of a court’s “jurisdiction”? Does a judicial decision
outside its “jurisdiction” include ultra vires judicial action of only some
kinds and not others? Or is “jurisdiction” a general principle limiting the
power of courts to deciding cases in accordance with governing law? (And
who answers these questions?) While we’re at it: Who decides what is the
proper scope of a “judgment” and whether that scope includes judicial or-
ders compelling prospective compliance with the judiciary’s view of the
Constitution?
If the courts decide all these things, the “Judgment Power” exception
is no exception at all, but the whole ball game. The judiciary decides the
scope of judicial power, the scope of a case, the scope of its jurisdiction, the
scope of its legitimate authority, and the scope of the obligation of all others
to obey its supreme commands.13
On the other hand, if the executive can decide some or all of these
things independently of the views of courts—then the judgment exception
begins to collapse into executive co-ordinate interpretive power as a general
proposition. That is, it becomes my position: the executive properly can
judge for himself, independently, whether the judiciary has acted within its
lawful constitutional authority; if not, the executive must decline to give
effect to the judiciary’s unlawful action. The judgment-within-its-jurisdic-
tion exception simply adds a step to the analysis. We’ve just taken an en-
11. Id. at 104–105.
12. See generally William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 (2008).
13. That of course is precisely what the Court purported to do in its (in)famous dictum in
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). See generally MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN & LUKE PAULSEN,
THE CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION 255–258 (2015).
I can hear the answer now: No, that type of judicial judgment—a judicial decision leveraging
forward the judgment power into a rule that judicial decisions state binding, prospective rules for
all other actors in all other situations—would be an improper, invalid “judgment”! I quite agree.
But then we are dealing with an understanding of “beyond jurisdiction” close to the broader notion
of an ultra vires judicial act of any description. If so, that is the essence of my position; on such
an understanding, there is no real difference (other than clarity) between the judgment-within-its-
jurisdiction “exception” and my more straightforward proposition of completely coordinate con-
stitutional review. (The only remaining question then is who decides whether the judiciary has
acted within its proper constitutional authority? I take up that point next in the text: obviously it
cannot be the judiciary or we are right back where we started.)
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tirely unnecessary extra lap around the block in order to arrive at the same
place we started.14
Middle positions don’t work. Either one believes in executive branch
coequal interpretive authority, independent of the decisions of the courts, or
one believes in judicial supremacy before which every knee ultimately can
be forced to bend and every head required to bow. For reasons detailed at
exhaustive length in prior writing,15 I believe that the premises of constitu-
tional supremacy and separation of powers vested in independent, coordi-
nate, coequal branches of government supports the former conclusion—
complete coordinacy—as disturbing as it might be in some of its applica-
tions, and as unsettling as it might be for current practice.
In my experience, folks conditioned by the myth of judicial supremacy
have trouble accepting this conclusion. But presented with a simple test-
case hypothetical, they sometimes start to yield just a little bit: where logic
and first principles do not convince (even though they should), perhaps a
fractured fairy tale—a story—will provide an assist.
II. A HYPOTHETICAL: THE SEDITION ACT OF 2017
Here’s my hypothetical:
Congress passes (either with a predecessor president’s signature or
over the incumbent president’s veto) the “Sedition Act of 2017,” which
makes it a crime to criticize the government of the United States. Such a
crime is designated as high treason and is punishable by death by slow
torture. The president is stripped of any discretion whether to bring prose-
cutions and also of the power to grant pardons to offenders. Certain offend-
ers are singled out by name—including one infamous law professor
Michael Stokes Paulsen—based on past conduct (in the form of expression
of views and opinions). The offenders are entitled to neither jury trial nor
due process nor judicial consideration of legal objections of any kind. The
president is, in fact, directed to carry out the executions immediately—the
same day if possible. (Of course, the “slow torture” provision will extend
the period of gradual death for some time; the whole process may last more
than twenty-four hours.) Finally, under this Sedition Act, the conviction of
the named offenders works a forfeiture of all assets and the corruption of
blood for the next six generations of direct lineal descendants of the guilty
party.
Is the described statute unconstitutional? (Please read a sinister stage-
smirk into this question.) Of course, it is! Obviously, yes, the Sedition Act
14. See Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 2, at 105 (noting that the “cases” or
“jurisdiction” position “only relocates the problem” and collapses into either complete judicial
supremacy or complete executive coordinacy). For a more extended refutation of the Will Baude
“Judgment Power” exception, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Checking the Court, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 18, 106–113 (2016).
15. See generally sources cited supra note 2.
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is unconstitutional about a half-dozen ways: It violates the First Amend-
ment freedoms of speech and press. It violates Article III’s definition of
treason. It unconstitutionally interferes with both the executive power and
pardon power of the president under Article II. It violates both due process
guarantees and jury-trial rights, and unconstitutionally interferes with the
Article III judicial power. It is both a bill of attainder and an ex post facto
law—as pure an illustration of each as one can imagine. Slow torture al-
most certainly violates the Eighth Amendment. And the Sedition Act even
violates the Constitution’s prohibition of penalties extending beyond the life
of the convicted and imposing a “corruption of blood.”
The point is that the statute is objectively, incontrovertibly unconstitu-
tional—as everyone (I hope) would agree. Can we all agree on this as a
starting point for all further discussion?
Pause and reflect on this for a moment. A necessary premise of what
follows is that there are such things as objectively correct answers to at least
some constitutional questions. We may sometimes disagree as to what those
answers are—and sometimes the “correct” answer may be that the Constitu-
tion permits a range of legitimate answers on a particular question or issue.
But not for this hypothetical, surely: the whole point of the hypothetical is
to factor-out of the equation any dispute as to the merits of the underlying
constitutional question, so as to focus on the question of judicial supremacy
in constitutional interpretation as a matter of pure principle. For if the pro-
position is that the Supreme Court’s judgments are, in some or all respects,
absolutely binding on other constitutional actors, irrespective of their cor-
rectness, then the way to test that proposition is to think about a situation
where we can all agree that the Supreme Court’s judgment is wrong.
That’s fair, isn’t it? If the obligation to abide by Supreme Court deci-
sions does not exist where the Supreme Court has decided a case incor-
rectly, then there is very little to the notion of judicial supremacy. If the
obligation to abide by a decision is in fact dependent, at some level, on the
correctness or incorrectness of the decision, then we’re not arguing about
judicial power and the absolute duty to obey judgments and conform to
judicial precedents; we’re arguing about the correctness or incorrectness of
the specific decision. That’s why I like to present the issue uncluttered by
disagreement over the correctness of the underlying decision. The issue is
best framed in a setting where we can all agree that the judicial decision is
wrong.16
16. But the Supreme Court would never, ever uphold such a statute! The Supreme Court
would never get such a constitutional decision so terribly wrong! Oh? The litany of atrocious,
almost unthinkable Supreme Court decisions is long and impressive: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393 (1857), Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873), Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and many, many more. For an argumentative catalog,
see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 995 (2003). Stop yourself, gentle reader, if you are starting to argue the legitimacy of one or
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I’m finally getting to the hypothetical question (or, rather, a series of
them). The final prop of the hypothetical is that you are the president. My
questions concern your constitutional powers and duties. Think about them
one by one, each in turn. (Really, scribble down your answers as we go.
This is a test!)
First, assume the Sedition Act bill is passed and presented to you for
your signature before becoming law. May you—must you—veto it, on con-
stitutional grounds? Is your decision, and the legitimacy of your contem-
plated veto, affected by whether or not you think the courts, and specifically
the U.S. Supreme Court, would agree with your constitutional judgment?
Second, assuming the law was enacted over your veto (or signed by a
predecessor), is it constitutionally proper for you to pardon Professor Paul-
sen—notwithstanding the prohibition of such pardons in the Act? Again, is
your decision affected by whether or not you think the Supreme Court
would agree? Would you pardon Paulsen if the Supreme Court had already
specifically upheld the provision of the Sedition Act abrogating the presi-
dential pardon power? (This is actually a variation of the next question in
the series.)
Third, more generally, may you refuse to execute the statute (or any of
its provisions) on constitutional grounds, based on your own independent
constitutional judgment? May you do so before the courts have spoken?
May you refuse to execute the statute after a test case has upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Sedition Act of 2017?
To extend the hypothetical: Suppose that, notwithstanding the provi-
sions of the statute barring judicial review and due process, Mr. Paulsen is
somehow able to get a test case heard and make his way to the Supreme
Court, which—somewhat astonishingly—rules against all of his constitu-
tional objections by a 5–4 vote. (You can make it 9–0 if you like. Nothing
really turns on the vote count, does it?) The case of Paulsen v. United States
has thus rejected each of Paulsen’s constitutional defenses. Returning to the
questions for you, the president, fleshed out by this further description: May
you decline to execute the statute in a subsequent case, involving another
alleged malefactor/violator—let’s call him Dean Vikram Amar—likewise
singled out by name in the Sedition Act as guilty of high treason? Or may
you refuse to honor the (wrong) Paulsen precedent in a subsequent case?
more of these decisions: that’s not the point; the point is that the Supreme Court can and does err,
sometimes grotesquely. Surely no one disputes that. At all events, the whole point of the exercise
is to first stipulate the existence of a clearly erroneous, harmful Supreme Court decision in order
to frame the question of whether other branches are bound to accede to the Supreme Court’s
decisions no matter what. The simplest way of thinking about this is to ask what should have been
the binding force of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott on the actions of nonjudicial
government officials. That is the way I frame the question in Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Au-
thority, supra note 2, at 1228–1230.
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Fourth, must you obey and execute the judgment in Paulsen v. United
States itself—and execute Paulsen—because of the Supreme Court’s judg-
ment in the specific case decided? (Let us assume a “so ordered” at the end
of the decision directing you, the president, to execute this impudent liti-
gant.) Or may you decline to execute the specific judgment in the specific
case, on the ground that it wrongly upheld the constitutionality of the Sedi-
tion Act of 2017?
My answers—the right answers!—are that you should veto the Sedi-
tion Act of 2017, pardon any and all offenders convicted under it, refuse to
bring prosecutions pursuant to it, and decline to “execute” any of its uncon-
stitutional provisions against any person, whether the courts have spoken or
not, whether the courts have upheld the Act’s provisions or not, and
whether the matter at hand involves the judgment in the specific case de-
cided or a different, factually indistinguishable one. Constitutionally, it is
not only your power but also your duty not to carry out the provisions of
this flagrantly unconstitutional act, irrespective of what the judiciary has
said.
The Sedition Act of 2017—which we all agreed was objectively, in-
controvertibly unconstitutional—is still objectively, incontrovertibly uncon-
stitutional. The Supreme Court’s decision saying it ain’t so does not change
objective constitutional reality or consequent constitutional duty. The Su-
preme Court’s decision in Paulsen is, in a word, wrong. As such, it has no
claim to legal validity in any respect. The answer to the final question of the
hypothetical is the same as the answers to all the others. You (of course!)
should not execute the specific judgment in the case of Paulsen v. United
States. You are constitutionally authorized, empowered, and obligated to let
me go, alive and free.
Is there any real doubt about this?
III. THE POWER AND DUTY OF THE PRESIDENT NOT TO ENFORCE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAWS
The president has the independent province of constitutional interpre-
tation in connection with the exercise of all of the president’s constitutional
powers. Marbury stands for the proposition of constitutional supremacy—
not judicial supremacy—and the independence of each of the branches of
the national government in the exercise of the duty to adhere faithfully to
the Constitution. (So too do other early defenses of the idea of constitu-
tional legal review, notably including The Federalist No. 78, stand for con-
stitutional supremacy and not any notion of judicial superiority over the
other branches of government.) The president swears an oath to “preserve,
protect, and defend” the Constitution, and pledges to faithfully execute the
laws of the United States, including the Constitution as supreme law. The
president thus has not only the constitutional power but also the duty not to
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enforce or defend unconstitutional laws. That duty applies in the carrying
out his legislative (veto), pardon, and executive powers.
The president’s duty is of course one of responsible, faithful, indepen-
dent constitutional interpretation. (Interpretive power does not equal inter-
pretive license.) The president may not simply do whatever he wants in the
name of the Constitution—just as the courts are not properly empowered to
do so. And there may be honest disagreements about what the Constitution
actually requires or permits. That too is to be expected; the branches’
checking and attempting to counter each others’ interpretations and actions
is fully part of the constitutional design. But in principle the interpretive
powers of the respective branches are almost precisely parallel.
In this section, I will sketch—rapidly—the president’s power and duty
not to enforce unconstitutional laws. In the next section, I will sketch the
correlative presidential power and duty not to enforce unconstitutional judi-
cial judgments or orders.
A. The President’s Independent Province of Constitutional
Interpretation
The president’s power of independent constitutional interpretation
closely tracks that of the courts and is justified by essentially identical pos-
tulates, premises, and reasoning. As I have developed at length elsewhere,17
Marbury’s argument for the power of judicial constitutional review rests on
three core premises: (1) constitutional supremacy (as distinguished from ju-
dicial supremacy, which finds no support in the text, structure, history, or
logic of the Constitution); (2) the structural independence of the branches as
an aspect of separation of powers and each branch’s separate responsibility
of adherence to the Constitution in the course of performing its specific
assigned constitutional responsibilities (in the case of the judiciary, decid-
ing cases in accordance with governing law, including the Constitution as
supreme law); and (3) the independent obligation of the oath of fidelity to
the Constitution, which requires each actor to adhere in good faith to the
Constitution, irrespective of the decisions of others that might depart from
it.
Each of these premises applies to the president the same as to the judi-
ciary. The Constitution is supreme law of superior obligation to every other
source of law and the president is charged with assuring the faithful execu-
tion of the laws. The president is specifically commanded to “take Care that
the laws be faithfully executed”18 and, to quote Marbury, the Constitution is
the “paramount law of the nation.”19 Finally, the president swears an oath to
17. Paulsen, supra note 1; Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 2, at 244. See
also Paulsen, Nixon Now, supra note 2.
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
19. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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support the Constitution—indeed, a unique and singular one, prescribed by
Article II itself, to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.20
The president is thus, by the logic of the argument of Marbury, bound
to adhere to the Constitution in his execution of the laws and in the per-
formance of all of his constitutional duties and powers. Just as it is “em-
phatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is” in
the course of performing judicial duties (deciding cases and controversies),
it is “empathically the province and duty” of the executive “to say what the
law is” in the course of performing executive duties (of law-execution and
other kinds). In each situation—judicial case-decision or executive law-exe-
cution—it is equally true that “[t]hose who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”21
So too is the president independent of the judiciary. Just as Marbury
held that the judiciary could not simply go along with whatever Congress
says on questions of constitutionality, but must employ its own good faith
judgment—otherwise it would be giving “a practical and real omnipo-
tence”22 to the deferred-to branch—the president cannot simply go along
with whatever another branch says. By the same reasoning that holds that
courts must refuse to apply unconstitutional statutes, the president likewise
must refuse to apply unconstitutional statutes. The president is no more
bound by Congress’s unconstitutional statutes than the courts are. And by
precisely the same reasoning, the president is no more bound by the Court’s
decisions misinterpreting the Constitution than the courts or president are
bound by Congress’s misinterpretations of the Constitution. Independence
is independence. In the hypothetical Sedition Act situation above, Paulsen
is simply wrong (the decision, that is, not the professor). For the president
to be bound by a judicial act contrary to the Constitution makes no more
sense than for the Court to be bound by a congressional act contrary to the
Constitution. A faithless misinterpretation of the Constitution is not binding
on another branch of government. Each actor is oath-bound to enforce the
Constitution and not the faithless departures from it by other governmental
actors.
The conclusion is inescapable. Under core principles of the separation
of powers, and under the reasoning of Marbury, no branch of the govern-
ment can be bound to accede to another’s violations of, or failures to abide
by, the Constitution. As I have summarized the point elsewhere:
The fundamental premise of the Constitution’s separation of pow-
ers into three great Departments is that they are all independent of
and co-equal with each other. None has a superordinate power
over any of the others—that is, a peremptory constitutional power
20. For elaboration on the presidential oath, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of
Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257, 1260–1267 (2004).
21. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
22. Id. at 178.
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to tell another branch what it must do or must not do. The inter-
section and interaction of the three Departments’ respective pow-
ers provide the means for mutual checking of one another; but
they are checks only, not trumps. The Constitution gives no
branch, including the judiciary, an ultimate trump power over the
others.23
The framers could not possibly have been any clearer on this score. As
James Madison put it in The Federalist No. 49: “The several departments
being perfectly co-o¨rdinate by the terms of their common commission,
neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of
settling the boundaries between their respective powers.”24 That is as cate-
gorical a rejection of one-branch interpretive supremacy, and as unequivo-
cal an embrace of interpretive coordinacy, as it is possible to imagine. It
entails a rejection of judicial supremacy every bit as much as a rejection of
congressional supremacy or executive supremacy in constitutional
interpretation.25
B. The President’s Duty Not to Enact, Enforce, or Defend
Unconstitutional Laws
Applying these principles, it is not hard to see how the president pos-
sesses an independent duty of faithful constitutional interpretation and how
that duty applies to all of the office’s constitutional powers. The president
of the United States, by virtue of his or her “common commission,” by
virtue of the separation of powers, and by virtue of the oath to preserve,
protect, and defend the Constitution, possesses an independent power and
duty of (responsible) constitutional interpretation. In the exercise of the
power to issue vetoes and grant pardons; in the exercise of the power and
duty to faithfully execute the laws; and in the exercise of the power and
duty to execute (lawful) judicial decrees, the president rightfully may inter-
pret the Constitution independently of the views of both Congress and the
courts, and act to check what he or she, in good faith, concludes are the
unconstitutional or unlawful actions of these other branches.
Run down the list: It follows from these general principles that the
president may issue vetoes and grant pardons on constitutional grounds,
independently of the views of the courts on the same underlying substantive
issues. Andrew Jackson did this in vetoing the bill re-chartering of the Sec-
ond Bank of the United States, invoking constitutional objections rejected
in their core premises by the Supreme Court’s decision in McCulloch v.
Maryland.26 Thomas Jefferson did this in pardoning persons convicted
23. Paulsen, Nixon Now, supra note 2, at 1351.
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 313 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
25. Paulsen, Nixon Now, supra note 2, at 1349–1358.
26. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 2, at 257–260 (discussing the
Jackson Bank veto).
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under the (actual!) Sedition Act of 1798 and whose convictions had been
upheld against legal challenge by the final federal courts with jurisdiction
over such federal criminal prosecutions. Both presidents invoked the inde-
pendence of the interpretive powers of the president in justifying their
actions.
“You seem to think,” Jefferson wrote to his challenging friend Abigail
Adams,
it devolved on the judges to decide on the validity of the sedition
law. But nothing in the Constitution has given them a right to
decide for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for
them. Both magistracies are equally independent in the sphere of
action assigned to them. The judges, believing the law constitu-
tional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine and imprisonment;
because the power was placed in their hands by the Constitution.
But the executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, were
bound to remit the execution of it; because that power has been
confided to them by the Constitution. That instrument meant that
its co-ordinate branches should be checks on each other. But the
opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws
are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in their
own sphere of action, but for the legislature and executive also, in
their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch.27
Likewise Andrew Jackson (who invoked his oath as establishing an
independent, personal duty of faithful constitutional interpretation):
Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution
swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is
understood by others. . . . The opinion of the judges has no more
authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the
judges, and on that point the President is independent of both. The
authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted
to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their leg-
islative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of
their reasoning may deserve.28
Jefferson and Jackson had it right. Their actions were not in defiance
of the Constitution, but in the exercise of their rightful, independent author-
27. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Smith Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 11 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49, 50–51 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellerby Bergh eds., 1904)
(emphasis added).
28. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139, 1145 (James D. Richardson ed., 1911). Jefferson likewise
invoked the oath in support of his pardons for violations of the Sedition Act (and also for his
refusals to execute the act in pending prosecutions), noting in his letter to Abigail Adams that his
duty to do so flowed from his “obligation[s] of an oath to protect the Constitution, violated by an
unauthorized act of Congress.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Smith Adams (July 22,
1804), in 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42, 44 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellerby
Bergh eds., 1904). For more on the Jefferson pardons and Jackson veto, see Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch, supra note 2, at 255–267.
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ity as a coequal branch of government to interpret the Constitution differ-
ently from the courts.
Consider next the case of non-execution of statutes on constitutional
grounds, including grounds rejected by the judiciary. Jefferson’s actions
with respect to the Sedition Act of 1798 illustrate this aspect of presidential
independent interpretive power as well. Upon becoming president, Jeffer-
son not only pardoned persons previously convicted under the Act, but di-
rected that pending prosecutions be ceased on the ground that the Act was
unconstitutional and therefore a legal nullity. The unconstitutionality of the
Sedition Act controlled all his actions as president with respect to that Act.
As he explained in a letter to William Duane soon after issuing his direc-
tive, “whenever in the line of my functions I should be met by the Sedition
law, I should treat it as a nullity.”29 Or, again, in Jefferson’s famous letter to
Abigail Adams:
I discharged every person under punishment or prosecution under
the sedition law, because I considered, and now consider, that law
to be a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if Congress had
ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image; and that it
was as much my duty to arrest its execution in every stage, as it
would have been to have rescued from the fiery furnace those
who should have been cast into it for refusing to worship the
image.30
Jefferson was hardly a loner in this regard. Literally dozens of presi-
dents, from Washington to Obama, have declined to execute statutes, or
parts of statutes, on constitutional grounds. Sometimes, those grounds have
been based on prior or expected judicial interpretations of the Constitution,
and sometimes not. Sometimes—as with Jefferson’s actions—those
grounds have flown in the face of judicial doctrine.31 Sometimes, such pres-
idential actions have come in the somewhat more timid form of “signing
statements” accompanying presidential signature of a bill into law, indicat-
ing that the president will “construe” the law in such a way as not to gener-
ate unconstitutional applications, or (a more forthright formulation) that the
president will not enforce aspects of an enacted law where doing so would
be unconstitutional.32 (There is an interesting side-debate over whether the
president is constitutionally obliged to veto a bill with unconstitutional as-
29. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Duane (May 23, 1801), in 34 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 169 (Barbara S. Oberg ed., 2007).
30. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Smith Adams (July 22, 1804), in 11 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42, 43–44 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellerby Bergh eds., 1904).
31. For partial compendia, see Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 2, at
255–257; SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 307–309 nn.45–69 (2015); J. Randy Beck, 16 CONST. COMMENT.
419 (1999) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF “UNCONSTITUTIONAL”
LAW: REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE (1998)).
32. For a good general treatment of this question, see Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner,
Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307 (2006).
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pects or provisions, or may sign the bill and “sever” its unconstitutional
applications by declaring that he will not enforce them.)33 Sometimes, such
presidential actions have come in the weak—and unprincipled—form of
actually enforcing a statute believed unconstitutional but then declining to
defend its constitutionality in judicial proceedings challenging its validity.34
The logic of the argument for presidential non-execution of unconstitu-
tional statutes is hard to assail: if the Constitution says one thing, and a
statute commands another, the president must give effect to the Constitution
and not to the faithless legislative act. That same logic applies even if the
judiciary (mistakenly) concludes that the statute is not unconstitutional—as
with my hypothetical Sedition Act of 2017, and as was actually the case
with judicial decisions sustaining the Sedition Act of 1798. Unless the Con-
stitution embraces a rule of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpreta-
tion (which it does not), or otherwise makes the president wholly
subordinate to the judiciary’s interpretations (which it does not), the presi-
dent has a plain constitutional obligation to refuse to give effect to any
statute he or she in good faith concludes is unconstitutional.35
33. Professor Prakash embraces a strict duty on the part of presidents to veto laws containing
unconstitutional provisions. See PRAKASH, supra note 31, at 304–306. This absolute duty turns out
to be less than absolute, however, as Prakash concedes that presidents need not always insist on
constitutional principle when it appears pointless or futile to do so. Id. at 315. I am not entirely
convinced by the argument that a president must veto a law containing unconstitutional provi-
sions, though I am certainly sympathetic to Prakash’s position. First, if a president is able to
decline to give legal effect to an unconstitutional provision through a different method—refusal to
execute that provision, on the ground that it is unconstitutional—it is not clear that he has to use
the veto-power method in order to fulfill his constitutional oath. Second, since unconstitutional
provisions frequently come packaged with other important substantive provisions of a bill passed
by Congress and presented to the president—there is no prohibition on a bill embracing multiple
subjects or items—the mandatory veto position would be somewhat analogous to arguing that
whenever the judiciary finds a provision of enacted law unconstitutional, it must enjoin enforce-
ment of the entire law as enacted, regardless of whether the unconstitutional provision is logically
severable from the remainder. This seems an extreme view. The president should be permitted to
declare unconstitutional and thus inoperative provisions within laws, just as the judiciary does,
without having to veto an entire bill; the president may, in effect, “sever” the unconstitutional
features from the constitutional ones and proclaim that the enacted law only contains the latter.
34. President Obama did this with respect to the Defense of Marriage Act in the actions that
eventually produced the judicial challenge culminating in United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744
(2013). This produces loads of problems. First, if a president in good faith believes a statute is
unconstitutional, it would appear to violate his oath for him to enforce that which he believes is
unconstitutional. Second, it seems especially indefensible to enforce an unconstitutional statute to
the deliberate injury of a private party. Third, it seems—all at once—absurdly deferential to judi-
cial supremacy, inconsistent with the proper bounds of judicial power as limited to genuine dis-
putes, and transparently hypocritical (and perhaps legally unethical) for a president to enforce a
believed unconstitutional statute in order to generate a contrived “test case” for judicial decision.
When the party nominally “defending” the unconstitutional statute does not in fact dispute the
position of those challenging it, the defense would seem to be a pretense and not a good faith
adversary proceeding. Some aspects of these problems were explored in Justice Scalia’s dissenting
opinion in Windsor. Id. at 780–783 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. Does the president likewise have a duty to give effect to statutes he believes constitutional
but the judiciary believes not constitutional? This seems at first a more disturbing proposition. But
I believe that the principle is actually the same, with a few qualifications I note presently. The
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C. The Duty of Responsible, Faithful, Independent Constitutional
Interpretation
What rightly bothers sensible people about recognizing the president’s
power of independent constitutional interpretation is the prospect that the
power could be abused by an abusive (or incompetent) president. Indeed, it
could; this is undeniable. Moreover, to frame the objection as strongly as
possible, the specter of such abuse seems especially realistic when the of-
fice is occupied by a president who lacks the qualities of character, judg-
ment, and intellectual discipline needed to perform the task of constitutional
interpretation faithfully and well. As of the time of this writing, the prospect
of abuse is not an unrealistic scenario.36
president’s obligation is to act in conformity with his or her best understanding of the correct
interpretation of the law, independently of the views of the judiciary. This means that the president
ordinarily will have a duty to execute constitutionally valid laws, irrespective of the judiciary’s
contrary views. As noted above, there is little or no intrinsic difference between an incorrect
judicial interpretation holding a law unconstitutional and one holding a law constitutional. See
supra note 7. The form that a judicial decision takes depends on the characterization of the legal
rights or interests in question and the merits of the claims made with respect to such legal rights or
interests. In many cases, an injury to legal rights or interests occurs regardless of the “direction” of
the holding. Dred Scott held unconstitutional the Missouri Compromise’s prohibition of slavery in
the territories, a decision that equally could be characterized as protecting constitutional inter-
ests—the constitutional property and substantive due process equal-status rights of slaveholders—
or defeating constitutional interests—the statutory right to freedom of Scott and his family under a
constitutionally valid federal law. Roe v. Wade held unconstitutional state laws restricting abor-
tion, a decision that equally could be characterized as protecting constitutional interests—the sub-
stantive due process liberty to abort the life of a human fetus—or defeating constitutional
interests—the statutory (and arguably constitutional) right to life, protected by government from
private violence by constitutionally valid state or federal law. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Plausibility of Personhood, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 13 (2012) (setting forth the plausible constitutional
argument for the legal personhood of the human fetus and the consequence that such persons may
possess legal rights to equal protection of the laws and due process of law).
An important caveat: The power (and duty) of the president affirmatively to execute constitu-
tionally valid laws, irrespective of an erroneous judicial decision of invalidity, is qualified in two
ways. First, as to power: the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendment jury rights of persons are best
understood as specific limitations on the power of the executive to execute the criminal laws (and
to some extent civil laws) against individuals. The trump-everyone interpretive province of the
jury—and perhaps certain further implications of such jury supremacy for judicial process gener-
ally—operates as a specific limitation on the independent interpretive power of the executive (and
for that matter, judges). For a more detailed discussion, see Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch,
supra note 2, at 288–292; cf. id. at 283 n.240. Second, as to duty: a case can be made that the
Constitution’s separation of powers, the consequent independent power and province of other
branches to check the president’s interpretations (and acts) with the powers at their disposal, and
the inevitable or probable practical operation of the constitutional system, given the allocation of
specific powers, legitimately may counsel presidential deference to, or accommodation of, the
positions of such other constitutional actors. See id. at 321–340 (discussing checks on executive
interpretive power, and the case for presidential deference and accommodation given the structure
and realities of the overall constitutional system).
36. This is not to say that presidents need to be sophisticated, law-school-educated high-
theory constitutional-law aficionados in order to exercise responsibly the power of independent
presidential constitutional interpretation. The prerogative of constitutional interpretation is a func-
tion of the office, not the skills of the officeholder. Indeed, sometimes an “unschooled,” intuitive,
common sense, plain reading of the Constitution’s text may have a stronger claim to methodologi-
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There are reasonable responses to this entirely reasonable objection.
First, in discussing whether independent interpretive power is correct in
principle, we should assume the faithful and responsible exercise of inter-
pretive power. This is only fair, if we are examining the correctness of the
proposition of interpretive coordinacy as a matter of principle. As noted
above, interpretive power does not properly equal interpretive license—a
point often forgotten, perhaps because of our experience with obvious judi-
cial abuse of (functional) judicial supremacy. Just as the judicial power “to
say what the law is” does not properly imply that “the law is what the Court
says it is,”37 the coequal presidential power to interpret the law does not
mean that a president rightfully may do whatever he or she wants by way of
constitutional interpretation. In both cases—with respect to the judiciary
and with respect to the executive—we should assume an equally thoughtful,
restrained, responsible exercise of interpretive power, at least for purposes
of judging whether the model of coequal interpretive power is correct as a
matter of principle.
Second, the possibility of the abuse of a power does not disprove the
existence of a power. What it proves instead is that we, the people, should
take care to vest interpretive power (or any government power, for that
matter) in officeholders, be they presidents or judges, who reasonably can
be expected to exercise such important power responsibly. (It may also tend
to prove that, wherever interpretive power is exercised, its exercise should
be constrained and justified by a proper interpretive method.)38 The pros-
pect of abuse of interpretive power does not refute the legitimacy and exis-
tence of such power as a matter of constitutional text and structure. It goes
to the propriety of its use in any particular instance—which is a different
question.
cal correctness than certain pseudo-sophisticated “academic” or “intellectual” approaches to con-
stitutional interpretation. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of
Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 AL-
BANY L. REV. 671, 674–676 (1996). Finally, other specific skills, experiences, and aptitudes are
probably far more important for presidents than training in constitutional law. On all these points,
see generally Paulsen, Protestantism and Comparative Competence, supra note 2, at 388–392; cf.
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 2, at 321–343. On proper interpretive method,
see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2009) (defending original-public-meaning textualism as the proper ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation).
It is perhaps fair to observe that some of our most lawyerly presidents—including some who
have been constitutional law professors—have not always been especially competent presidential
constitutional interpreters. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Avoid an Unconstitutional
War: A Beginner’s Guide for Presidents and Congresses, PUB. DISCOURSE (Sept. 9, 2013), http://
www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/09/10877/; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Unprecedented, Ex-
traordinary, Anti-Democratic, Activist Power of Judicial Review, PUB. DISCOURSE (Apr. 23,
2012), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/04/5246/.
37. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 2741 (collecting references).
38. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 2, at 340–342; cf. Paulsen, supra
note 1, at 2739–2742.
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Third, the possibility of abuse of interpretive power of course exists
wherever it is vested. It is almost too obvious for argument that the courts
have, on more than a few occasions, engaged in abusive misinterpretation
of the Constitution, to the great harm of individuals, the nation, and the
Constitution.39 Lawyers, conditioned from law school to love courts and
disdain politicians, have a perhaps exaggerated fear of what presidential
(mis)interpreters might do and an unduly suppressed alertness to what judi-
cial (mis)interpreters might do and have often done.
Fourth, and related to the previous point, if one fears abuse of interpre-
tive power—which is a possibility wherever it exists—the appropriate rem-
edy is surely not to concentrate such interpretive power in a single set of
hands and make its exercise (largely) immune to checks and correction by
other, competing interpretive power centers. That is the fundamentally
flawed political premise of the judicial supremacist view. Rather, the cor-
rect remedy is to affirm the division and separation of interpretive power
among competing institutions, each with the power and incentives to check
abuses by the other branches.40 The courts and Congress possess real, quite
potent checks on presidential constitutional misinterpretation. The power of
independent judicial judgment, while not properly a power to command the
other branches, still has real moral force. Even if the courts command no
troops, persuasive, principled independent judgment can command public
respect and acceptance—which in our political culture counts for a great
deal. Congress’s impeachment power—including the power to impeach of-
ficers for what Congress judges to be violations of the Constitution and an
officer’s oath to uphold it—is, or should be, a serious constitutional
check.41 Thus, while there may be dangers to the view of coequal interpre-
tive power, these dangers are largely answered by the checks that every
other actor has on the errant interpretations of any particular faithless con-
stitutional interpreter.
In the end, that is the only answer consistent with the Framers’ design
of a Constitution whose core structural features are written constitutional-
ism, constitutional supremacy, the separation of powers, and federalism. It
makes no sense as a matter of our Constitution’s first principles to say that,
because a power is capable of being abused, it therefore must be vested in a
single branch that has supremacy over all others with respect to that power.
39. See Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, supra note 16 (collecting
notorious examples).
40. See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 2742.
41. See Paulsen, Checking the Court, supra note 14, at 67–90; Paulsen, supra note 1, at 2729
(discussing Congress’s power to impeach presidents and judges for believed violations of consti-
tutional faithfulness and duty).
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IV. THE POWER AND DUTY OF THE PRESIDENT NOT TO ENFORCE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The final step is, for many, the hardest to take. But it follows logically
from the others: if the president possesses a truly coequal interpretive power
with the courts; if the president is not bound by what he concludes, in good
faith, are the errant interpretations of the judiciary, with respect to the exer-
cise of his constitutional powers of the veto, the pardon, and law-execution
generally, then—absent some other contradicting constitutional com-
mand—the president likewise has the power and duty not to execute a case-
specific judicial judgment that is contrary to law.
There is no such contradicting constitutional command with respect to
judgments.42 As noted above (in Part I of this essay), it is impossible in
principle to distinguish, in a way that holds up, a discrete “judgment power”
from the position of judicial supremacy, generally. In addition, returning to
the hypothetical Sedition Act of 2017, it seems difficult to conclude that, as
President of the United States, you have a constitutional duty not to follow
Paulsen v. United States in a subsequent case (and thus must not execute
Dean Vik Amar) but that you have a duty to follow and execute the specific
judgment in Paulsen itself, and therefore must execute Paulsen. If the Sedi-
tion Act of 2017 is objectively, incontrovertibly unconstitutional—as we all
agree it is—it remains objectively, incontrovertibly unconstitutional not-
withstanding a judicial decision to the contrary.
Recall again the straightforward syllogism of Marbury. If the Constitu-
tion says one thing, and an act of a subordinate authority says something to
the contrary, the obligation of all who swear an oath to uphold and are
vested with authority under the Constitution is to follow the Constitution
and not the faithless act of the subordinate authority. Each branch is inde-
pendent of the others. The president is as independent of the courts as he or
she is independent of Congress. The president, by the logic of the argument
of Marbury (and The Federalist No. 78) must give effect to the proper
meaning of the Constitution rather than the faithless departure from it by
another branch, whether that branch is Congress or the Court. It follows
that, under the Sedition Act hypothetical, you—as President of the United
States—must not execute the unconstitutional, unlawful judicial judgment
in Paulsen, the same as you must not execute the unconstitutional statute in
the first place, against any person.
The power and duty of the president not to execute unlawful judicial
judgments does not require acceptance of any premises beyond those that
justify non-execution of statutes on constitutional grounds not yet accepted
or previously rejected by the courts. It merely requires following those
same premises to their natural conclusion rather than arbitrarily cutting off
logic when the results it produces are uncomfortable or unfamiliar.
42. For elaboration, see Paulsen, Checking the Court, supra note 14, at 100–115.
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In both situations, the president’s power to decline to execute the ac-
tion of another branch (Congress, with respect to unconstitutional statutes;
the judiciary, with respect to unconstitutional judgments) flows from: (1)
the supremacy of the Constitution itself, and the Oath to adhere to the Con-
stitution and not to the actions of another branch departing from it; (2) the
structural independence of the branches each from the others; and (3) the
reinforcing logic of the Take Care Clause of Article II. When an unconstitu-
tional statute, to be carried into effect, requires the exercise by the president
of his or her constitutional powers—the power to execute the laws faith-
fully—the president must refuse to abet the constitutional violation. When
an unlawful or unconstitutional judicial decision, to be carried into effect,
requires the exercise by the president of his or her constitutional powers—
the same law-executing power, but with specific reference to the execution
of judicial judgments—the president must refuse to abet the constitutional
violation.
To be sure, there has not been an extensive history of such presidential
refusal to execute judicial decrees on constitutional grounds in the same
way that there has been an extensive history of presidential precedents for
non-execution of statutes on constitutional grounds. My prior research and
writing has identified only one true example of the non-execution power
with respect to judgments actually being used by a president: President
Abraham Lincoln’s refusal to carry into effect Chief Justice Taney’s deci-
sion as a circuit justice holding unconstitutional Lincoln’s suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus at the outbreak of the Civil War.43
But rarity of exercise is not dispositive as to constitutional propriety: there
may have been relatively few clear occasions for the power’s legitimate and
justifiable exercise; there may have been many instances in which practical
considerations prevented exercise of the power, or where the issue washed
out in the give-and-take of practical and political interplay of the branches;
and there indeed may have been instances in which the power ought to have
been employed and wrongfully was not.
To the extent specific historical support for a power to refuse execu-
tion of judgments is thought necessary, it comes from an especially interest-
ing and persuasive-evidence-of-original-meaning source: Alexander
Hamilton, writing on the proper understanding of the judicial power in The
Federalist No. 78. That paper is Hamilton’s famous exposition of judicial
power: why the judicial task entailed a logical power to constitutional legal
review; why the judicial power was in principle the “least dangerous” and
“beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power”; why
the judiciary could “never attack with success either of the other two” and
43. See Paulsen, The Merryman Power, supra note 2, at 88–91; see also Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch, supra note 2, at 276–284; Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, supra note
2.
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therefore needed the fortification of life tenure to protect it from being over-
powered by the others; and, crucially, why the judicial power was not to be
feared in a system of rigorous separation of powers. In a clinching and
important phrase at the conclusion of his famous “neither FORCE nor
WILL but merely judgment” passage, Hamilton noted, almost as a matter of
fact observation, the power of executive review of judicial judgments as an
implicit check on judicial power: the judicial branch, Hamilton wrote,
“must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the
efficacy of its judgments.”44
In the same vein, more than 235 years later, the power of the president
to decline enforcement to judgments exceeding judicial power was seem-
ingly recognized by the late Justice Antonin Scalia in his dissent in
Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015—one of Justice Scalia’s last great impas-
sioned dissents. Scalia concluded his dissent with an appeal to the ultimate
weakness of the judiciary, noting the constitutional power of the other
branches of government to counteract judicial decisions that abused the
courts’ proper constitutional authority. Scalia turned to the same famous
statement of Hamilton as quoted above: “The Judiciary is the ‘least danger-
ous’ of the federal branches because it has ‘neither Force nor Will, but
merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive
arm,’ and the States, ‘even for the efficacy of its judgments.’”45
Hamilton, Lincoln, and Scalia had it right. The president’s independent
province of constitutional interpretation extends, in principle, to the exer-
cise even of the power not to execute judicial judgments in specific cases,
where the court’s decision is contrary to the Constitution or other control-
ling law. Much to my personal relief, in the hypothetical situation involving
the Sedition Act of 2017, it is clear that your constitutional duty is to not
execute the Supreme Court’s flatly wrong decision in Paulsen—and to not
execute me!
CONCLUSION
I conclude, as I did the live debate, with a challenge to Dean Amar: Is
there really any plausible argument that the president is constitutionally
bound by the judiciary’s views as to questions of constitutionality, in the
exercise of the president’s powers, where the president concludes in good
faith that the judiciary’s decision is simply wrong? Must the president de-
cline to veto the Sedition Act of 2017? If enacted, must the president de-
cline to grant pardons to persons “convicted” of violating it (or, rather,
declared to have violated it)? Must the president execute the statute, not-
44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). For
further discussion of the force of this passage, and other confirming references in Hamilton’s other
Federalist papers on the judiciary, see Paulsen, Checking the Court, supra note 14, at 100–104.
45. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2631 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
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withstanding its manifest unconstitutionality? Must the president do so if
the judiciary has held the statute to be constitutional (notwithstanding its
manifest unconstitutionality)? Must the president do so in the specific case
so holding? Is there really any truly principled constitutional distinction
among any of these different cases of the exercise of presidential power
under the Constitution?
